Since the publication of Nash's (1950, 1953) pioneering working on bargaining, game theorists have developed an interesting collection of bargaining solutions with wide applications. Game-theoretic models of bargaining have become some of the most fruitful paradigms in game theory. The purpose of this talk is two-fold. First, I will present recent advances that are aimed at reducing weaknesses of bargaining solutions, relating to the requirement of convexity or randomized devices. Convexity is not satisfied by familiar economic problems, while randomized devices are not practical for problems such as duopoly or labor-management bargaining. I will illustrate, using duopoly and labor-management bargaining, that the advances greatly enhance the applicability of bargaining solutions. Second, I will also present recent advances that are aimed at unifying the various bargaining solutions. Existing bargaining solutions are developed individually and as such, they each may miss certain features of the bargaining problem. A unification is useful for comparing different solutions and hence for helping one choose a suitable solution in applications.